Introduction
One very robust …nding of the empirical literature on trade protection is the positive correlation between the level of trade barriers and the rate of unemployment. The same pattern can be observed across industries, among countries, and over time; see e.g. Trefler [1993] , Mansfield and Busch [1993] , and Bohara and Kaempfer [1991] , respectively. These …ndings are echoed by recent empirical studies of individual tradepolicy preferences emphasizing the prevalence of labor market concerns; see e.g. Scheve and Slaughter [2004] .
Though well-documented empirically, such …ndings are hard to rationalize theoretically. By construction, none of the standard trade models, either Ricardo-Viner or Heckscher-Ohlin, even allows the possibility of unemployment. The main objective of our paper is to build a simple theory that is consistent with the previous evidence and to show how it may shed a new light on the traditional determinants of protectionism across countries, industries, and individuals.
Section 2 describes our model. We consider a small open economy with multiple sectors, each of them subject to search frictions à la Pissarides [2000] . There is a continuum of workers, each endowed with one unit of human capital that is either general or sector-speci…c. Workers endowed with general human capital may produce in all industries; those with speci…c human capital may only produce in one of them. There is a continuum of …rms, each free to choose the sector in which they want to post a vacancy. Workers and …rms come together randomly. Once a worker and a …rm are matched, wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
In equilibrium, jobs generate rents in each sector. Like in the Ricardo-Viner model, the magnitude of those rents may depend on the level of trade protection. The distinct feature of our model is that trade protection may also a¤ect the access to those rents. By raising the domestic price of a given good, a government may attract more …rms in a given industry. This raises the probability that a worker will …nd a job in this sector, and in turn, will bene…t from the associated rents.
In our model, search frictions create a rationale for trade protection: improving labor market conditions. This rationale appears because the economy is not, in general, on its e¢ cient production possibility curve. The chance of a worker to …nd a job in a given industry depends on the total number of vacant …rms and unemployed workers present in this industry, which creates trading externalities. There is a priori no reason why wages, determined by Nash bargaining, would internalize these externalities.
Of course, we are not trying to suggest that trade protection should be used to correct this distortion. Bhagwati's [1971] classical argument still applies to our environment; the optimal policy intervention should involve a tax-cum-subsidy addressed directly to o¤setting the source of the distortion. Instead, we adopt a purely positive perspective. Conditional on the existence of search frictions, we analyze how their crosssectoral and cross-country variations a¤ect protectionist incentives. Section 3 characterizes the structure of trade protection. We assume that governments aim to maximize aggregate social welfare, but restrict the set of available policy instruments to speci…c trade taxes. Our model predicts that in a cross-section of industries or countries, those parameters which are positively correlated with the unemployment rate-workers'bargaining power and turnover rate-should also be positively correlated with trade taxes. The converse is true for those parameters which are negatively correlated with unemployment-world price and workers' productivity. Intuitively, sectors or countries with more unemployment operate further away from their e¢ cient possibility curves. In turn, the marginal bene…ts from raising trade taxes, and so creating jobs, are higher.
Our prediction regarding workers'productivity, in particular, is consistent with various empirical studies reviewed by Rodrik [1995] . In line with our theory, trade barriers tend to be higher: in labor-intensive, low-skill, low-wage industries; in periods of recession; and of course, in poor countries. Despite this evidence, it is worth emphasizing that our prediction is not a standard one. In the Grossman and Helpman [1994] model, which has become the workhorse of the profession, the level of protection for organized sectors increases with the level of domestic output. Alternative political economy approaches, e.g. Findlay and Welliz [1982] and Hillman [1982] , lead to the same prediction.
By focusing on the access to protection rents-the extensive marginrather than their magnitude-the intensive margin-our theory is able to generate the opposite result. 3 Section 4 analyzes the determinants of trade-policy preferences across workers. We extend our model by allowing workers to vary by skills. We assume that workers' skills are perfectly observable by …rms and that …rms may only search for one type of workers. Since skilled workers generate larger amounts of output, a larger number of …rms search for them, which increases their chance of …nding a job. We consider a hypothetical episode of trade liberalization where trade taxes are uniformly decreased across sectors. Whether or not an individual should favor this policy change depends on the trade-o¤ between the bene…ts from freer trade-higher consumer surplus-and the associated costs-destruction of existing jobs and di¢ culty of …nding new jobs once unemployed.
Our model predicts that workers with general human capital are less likely to be protectionist. This may help explain, for example, the negative impact of age on attitudes towards free trade; see e.g. O' Rourke and Sinott [2001] and Mayda and Rodrik [2005] . If workers' discount factors are large, our model also predicts that more productive workers are less likely to be protectionist. In this situation, the main determinant of workers'trade-policy preferences is the probability of losing their jobs. As a result, more productive workers-who are less likely to become unemployed-also are less likely to be protectionist. This result may help explain why: (i) high-skilled workers tend to be less protectionist than low-skilled workers, irrespectively of their countries of origin; and (ii) why workers in more developed countries tend to be less protectionist, irrespectively of their skill level; see e.g. Again, these predictions, while intuitive in a model with unemployment, stand in sharp contrast to those of standard trade models. For example, the 2 2 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that unskilled workers in a less developed country-who win more or at least lose less from free trade-should tend to be less protectionist than their counterparts in a more developed country. Yet, this is not what we observe in practice.
The impact of labor market imperfections on trade has been the focus of a series of papers by Carl Davidson and Steven Matusz; see Davidson and Matusz [2004] . Among these papers, Davidson et al. [1999] is most closely related to ours. They consider an economy with search frictions and two factors, capital and labor. They demonstrate how the turnover rate of an industry may a¤ect preferences towards trade liberalization across factors of production. In sectors where turnover is large, capital-owners and workers should have opposite preferences, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. While in sectors where turnover is low, they should have similar preferences, as in the Ricardo-Viner model. Using data on campaign contributions, Magee et al. [2005] …nd strong support for these two predictions.
More recently, Matschke and Sherlund [2006] have extended the Grossman and Helpman [1994] model to allow for labor market considerations. They introduce collective bargaining, imperfect labor mobility, and trade-union lobbying. Compared to the original, their model predicts that the level of trade protection should be higher if the tradeunion lobbies, but capital owners do not; and conversely, that the level of trade protection should be lower if capital owners lobby, but the tradeunion does not. Using data from U.S. manufacturing industries, they …nd strong support for their labor-augmented model.
Our paper contributes to the previous literature in two ways. First, it isolates a new determinant of protectionism, the access to protection rents. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it shows how this channel may systematically a¤ect trade taxes and trade-policy preferences in a way that is both consistent with a large body of empirical work and distinct from the predictions of standard trade models.
The Economy
We consider a small open economy with i = 0; :::; n sectors, each of them subject to search frictions à la Pissarides [2000].
Workers
There is a mass 1 of workers. Each worker is endowed with 1 unit of human capital that is either general or sector-speci…c. 4 There are no other factors of production. Workers endowed with general human capital may produce in all industries; those with speci…c human capital may only produce in one of them. We denote by s i the proportion of workers with human capital speci…c to sector i; and by g = 1 P n i=0 s i the proportion of workers with general human capital.
Except for human capital di¤erences, workers are identical. Each worker is in 1 of 2 states: employed or unemployed. Unemployed workers search for jobs in the industry that maximizes their expected lifetime utility
where r is the discount rate, c t 0 is the consumption of good 0 at time t, and c t i is the consumption of good i = 1; :::; n. We assume that the subutility functions i ( ) satisfy the following regularity conditions: 0 i > 0, 00 i < 0 and 000 i 0. The …rst two inequalities are standard; the last one guarantees that the structure of trade protection does not depend on demand di¤erences across industries.
Good 0 is used as the numeraire good with world and domestic price equal to one. We call p i the exogenous world price of good i, and p i its domestic price. The demand for good i is denoted by
In turn, the indirect utility of a worker is given by
where x t is the worker's income at date t, p = (p 1 ; :::; p n ) is the vector of domestic prices, and s(p)
is the surplus derived from the consumption of these goods. We assume that x t = w i + + ! if the worker is employed in sector i at date t, and x t = + ! if she is unemployed. w i corresponds to the wages paid by …rms in sector i; + ! corresponds to the income that each worker, employed or not, derives from government transfers and …rms'dividends !.
Firms
There is a large mass of …rms. Each …rm can employ at most 1 worker 5 and is in 1 of 3 states: inactive, un…lled vacancy, and …lled job. A …rm with a …lled job in sector i generates revenues equal to p i a i per unit of time. The parameter a i measures output per worker in sector i. 6 A …rm with an un…lled vacancy does not generate any revenues and must pay recruiting costs k per unit of time. An inactive …rm obtains a pay-o¤ of zero.
Each …rm chooses in which industry to post a vacancy (if any) in order to maximize its expected discounted pro…ts
where t are the …rm's net revenues at date t and n t 2 f0; 1g is the number of its un…lled vacancies. By de…nition, t = p i a i w i if the …rm employs a worker in sector i, and zero otherwise.
Labor market
We denote by l i the size of sector i, that is the mass of workers either employed or searching for a job in sector i. Firms and workers come together randomly. The number of matches taking place per unit of time is given by
where v i and u i are the vacancy and unemployment rates in sector i, respectively. Throughout this paper, we assume that v i < u i for all i. 7 Hence, …rms with un…lled vacancies …nd workers with probability one, while unemployed workers "wait at the gate"and …nd jobs with probability i = v i u i . We further discuss this assumption and its implications in the next section.
When a …rm and a worker are matched, wages are determined by Nash bargaining
where U i and W i are the expected lifetime utility of, respectively, an unemployed and an employed worker in sector i; V i and J i are the expected discounted pro…ts of, respectively, a …rm with an un…lled vacancy and a …lled job; and i 2 (0; 1) is workers'bargaining power in sector i.
Finally, existing jobs are randomly destroyed following a Poisson process. During a small interval dt, each worker has a probability i dt 6 Here, a i measures labor productivity in sector i. One could extend our model to include physical capital; see Pissarides [2000] . As long as there exists a perfect second-hand market for capital goods, this extension would leave our results unchanged (although a i would also measure the capital intensity of sector i). 7 This inequality is satis…ed if, for example, the recruiting costs k are large enough.
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of moving from employment to unemployment. We refer to i as the turnover rate in sector i.
Steady-state equilibrium
We focus on the steady-state equilibrium in each industry. This equilibrium includes the 4 value functions (U i ,W i ,V i ,J i ), the wage w i , the unemployment rate u i , the vacancy rate v i , and the sector size l i . The 4 value functions satisfy the 4 Bellman equations
Nash bargaining implies
where i = W i + J i U i V i is the total surplus generated by a job. Free entry of …rms further implies
Finally, the unemployment rate in a steady-state satis…es
Note that the sector size l i does not appear in any of the previous equations. Thus, we have a system of seven equations with seven unknowns. Following Rogerson et al. [2005] , we directly solve for the equilibrium values of i and i . We …nd
Equations (13) and (14) completely characterize the equilibrium.
and v i can be computed by simple substitutions. Once U i has been computed for all i, the sector size l i is given by:
Workers with human capital speci…c to sector i always search for a job in this sector; those with general human capital search for a job in the sector that gives them the highest lifetime expected utility. In the knifeedge case where multiple sectors give these workers the same expected utility, this implies, of course, multiple equilibria.
Equation (13) implies that the domestic price of good i has no e¤ect on the surplus generated by a job in sector i. This feature of the model comes from the particular form of our matching function. Under any other matching function with constant returns to scale, one can show that p i increases i . In other words, trade protection raises, in general, the magnitude of the rents of the factors employed in a given industry. While this e¤ect is likely to be important in practice, there is nothing new about it. It is already present in the Ricardo-Viner model, absent of any search frictions. Assuming (rather crudely) that workers wait at the gate allows us to shut down this alternative incentive for trade protection and to shed light on the new features of the model. From equation (14), we see that the domestic price of good i a¤ects the tightness of the labor market in industry i. As p i goes up, more …rms enter industry i, which raises the probability i that a worker …nds a job in this industry. 8 This channel generates a rationale for trade protection: improving labor market conditions.
The Structure of Protection
The previous section describes the equilibrium of the economy, taking domestic prices as given. We now analyze how the government's trade taxes endogenously determine these prices.
The government' s maximization program
We assume that the government aims to maximize aggregate social wel-
is the social welfare associated with the workers of sector i. Following Grossman and Helpman [1994], we restrict the set of policy instruments available to the government to speci…c trade taxes: t i = p i p i for i = 1; :::; n. If good i is imported, t i represents a speci…c import tari¤; if good i is exported, it represents an export subsidy. All trade revenues are redistributed uniformly to workers. Hence, the net lump-sum transfer to each worker is given by
where
The income that each worker derives from …rms'dividends is given by
Using (6), (10), (11) and (18), equation (16) can be rearranged as
We are now ready to describe the equilibrium policies.
Equilibrium policies
We …rst consider the marginal e¤ect on G of an increase in sector i's trade tax. If G is di¤erentiable, which is generically true, 9 then equation (19) implies
The …rst term is standard; @ @t i and @s @t i correspond to the marginal changes in trade revenues and consumer surplus, respectively. Our contribution to the previous literature lies in the second term. When there are search frictions, raising the level of trade protection in a given industry improves labor market conditions. It raises welfare in sector i by: (i) increasing the number of jobs generating rents, @u i
and (ii) increasing the chances of unemployed workers to bene…t from these rents in the future, @ i @t i > 0. In the rest of this paper, we restrict our attention to interior equilibria. The equilibrium policy t o i in each industry is implicitly de…ned by the …rst-order condition: @G @t i t o i = 0 (21) 9 Formally, G is di¤erentiable if: (i) there exists a unique i 0 such that U i0 > max i6 =i0 U i ; or if: (ii) for any pair of sectors i 1 and i 2 such that U i1 = U i2 = max i6 =i0 U i , we have G i1 = G i2 . In the former case, a marginal increase in the trade tax does not a¤ect sector sizes; in the latter case, changes in sector sizes do not a¤ect @G @ti . In any other knife-edge case, @G @ti = + or 1 for at least 2 sectors.
Using equations (12) , (13) , (14) , and the de…nition of y i ( ), equation (21) can be rearranged as
Note that sector size l i does not appear in equation (22) . Thus, the equilibrium policy t o i is independent of l i , and in turn, s i . In our model, the proportion of workers with sector-speci…c human capital does not a¤ect labor market conditions across industries. As a result, it does not a¤ect the structure of trade protection either.
Note also that our theory predicts import tari¤s or export subsidies in each industry. Since d 0 i < 0, equation (22) implies t o i > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n. This result derives from the nature of the labor market imperfections in our economy. While unemployed workers exert negative search externalities on other unemployed workers, vacant …rms do not exert any externality on other vacant …rms (they always …nd workers with probability one). As a result, the unemployment rate is too high and an import tari¤ or export subsidy that raises the level of employment also raises social welfare.
As already mentioned in the introduction, we are not trying to make a normative case in favor of the use of trade taxes. In our economy, they are at most a second-best policy. Output subsidies at the rate t o i would achieve the same level of employment in sector i without distorting consumers'behavior; see e.g. Krugman and Helpman [1989] . Instead, we follow a common practice in the trade literature and assume thatfor reasons beyond the scope of our model-trade taxes are the only policy instruments available. 10 We then use this assumption to analyze the determinants of trade protection across countries and industries.
Cross-sectoral and cross-country variations
We now analyze the impact of 4 exogenous parameters of the model, z i 2 fa i ; i ; i ; p i g, on the equilibrium policy t o i . In order to gain intuition, we …rst investigate the e¤ect of a hypothetical change in the tightness of the labor market i , holding everything else constant. By the implicit function theorem, we have 10 Admittedly, this is an ad-hoc assumption. But as Rodrik [1995] already put it a decade ago: "A su¢ ciently general and convincing explanation for this phenomenon [the use of trade policy over more e¢ cient instruments] has yet to be formulated".
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Because of the second-order condition @ 2 G
, which is negative by equation (22) . Since the unemployment rate is a decreasing function of i , our model further implies:
Proposition 1 Ceteris paribus, there is more protection in sectors-or countries-with high unemployment rates.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is simple. Increasing the probability of …nding jobs i creates more jobs if the unemployment rate is high. As a result, the marginal bene…ts from raising trade taxes are higher in sectors-or countries-with more unemployment. In equilibrium, higher marginal bene…ts lead to higher trade taxes.
Proposition 1 is consistent with numerous empirical studies. In the handbook of international economics, Rodrik [1995] mentions the work of: Bohara and Kaempfer [1991] who …nd that U.S. tari¤s are Granger-caused by unemployment; Mansfield and Busch [1993] who …nd that non-tari¤ barriers are higher in countries that have higher unemployment rates; and Trefler [1993] who …nds that the degree of protection is greater in industries with more unemployment. After controlling for the Grossman and Helpman [1994] determinants of trade protection, Goldberg and Maggi [1999] reach the same conclusion: sectors with high unemployment rates tend to receive more protection.
Of course, the tightness of the labor market, itself, is not exogenous. Its value depends on a i , i , i , p i and t i according to equation (14) . We now consider the impact of a given parameter z i 2 fa i ; i ; i ; p i g. Its marginal e¤ect on the equilibrium policy can be computed similarly Table 1 reports the signs of @t o i @z i and @u i @z i for z i 2 fa i ; i ; i ; p i g. The exact analytical expressions can be found in the appendix. Quite remarkably, we can sign the impact of our 4 exogenous parameters on the equilibrium trade policy. In a cross-section of industries or countries, our theory predicts that those parameters which are positively correlated with the unemployment rate-workers' bargaining power i and turnover rate i -should also be positively correlated with trade taxes. The converse is true for those parameters which are negatively correlated with unemployment-output per worker a i and world price p i . Our …ndings are summarized in proposition 2. Prediction (i) is consistent with a large number of empirical studies reviewed by Rodrik [1995] . In line with our theory, trade protection tends to be higher in labor-intensive, low-skill, low-wage industry; see Caves [1976] , Saunders [1980] , Anderson [1980] , Ray [1981] , Marvel and Ray [1983] , Baldwin [1985] , Anderson and Baldwin [1987] , Ray [1991] , and Finger and Harrison [1994] . Similarly, trade protection tends to be higher in periods of recession; see Ray [1987] , Hansen [1990] , and O' Halloran [1994] . Prediction (i) also is consistent with the well-known fact that rich countries tend to be less protectionist. 11 Prediction (ii) is consistent with the recent …ndings of Matschke and Sherlund [2006] . After controlling for the Grossman and Helpman [1994] determinants of trade protection, the authors …nd that the unionization rates of industries remain positively correlated with their level of protections. Finally, prediction (iii) also is consistent with Rodrik [1995]'s review of the stylized facts; trade protection tends to increase with the level of import-penetration in a given industry. We are not aware of any empirical study investigating the relationship between the cross-sectoral variations in job turnover and trade protection.
The introduction of search frictions à la Pissarides [2000] provides a strong rationalization of the stylized facts o¤ered in the introduction. In our model, any parameter which increases (resp. decreases) the unemployment rate also increases (resp. decreases) the equilibrium trade tax. Hence, declining industries which are heavily unionized and face tough competition from abroad accumulate reasons to receive more protection.
It is worth emphasizing again that our prediction regarding the relationship between output per worker and trade protection, although consistent with a large body of empirical work, is not a standard one. In the well-known "Protection for Sale" model of Grossman and Helpman [1994] , the level of protection for organized sectors increases with output per worker. Within their framework, speci…c-factor owners gain more from an increase in the domestic price when domestic output is large. By focusing on the access to protection rents rather than their magnitude, our theory generates the opposite result.
Trade-Policy Preferences
In sections 2 and 3, we have presented a simple economy with search frictions in the labor market and characterized the structure of trade protection in this environment. We now investigate the impact of search frictions on trade-policy preferences across workers j 2 [0; 1]. To this end, we extend our analysis by allowing workers'human capital to vary in terms of level and speci…city.
Human capital and labor market outcomes
Throughout this section, we assume that workers are endowed with h j units of human capital, out of which 1 j h j are general and j h j are sector-speci…c. The parameters h j > 0 and 1 j 0 measures the level and speci…city of worker j's human capital, respectively. Section 2 corresponds to the particular case where h j = 1 and j = 0 or 1 for all j 2 [0; 1].
We denote by a j i = a i h j 1 j i the output (per unit of time) of worker j when matched with a …rm in sector i. By de…nition, j i = 0 if worker j has human capital speci…c to sector i, and j i = j otherwise. With a slight abuse of notations, a i now represents the productivity of human capital in sector i. In the spirit of Hall and Jones [1999], one may interpret a i as a measure of physical capital per worker and the quality of social infrastructure, which may vary across countries and industries. We refer to h j 1 j i as the skill level, or type, of worker j in sector i. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that workers'skill levels are perfectly observable and that …rms can only search for one type of workers.
Under these assumptions, we can solve for the steady-state equilibrium as we did in section 2. Labor markets are segmented by skill levels. Free entry guarantees that …rms are indi¤erent between searching for high-or low-skilled workers: V j i = 0 for all j. Irrespectively of sector size, the labor market equilibrium for each type of workers is determined by equations (6) to (12) . In turn, the total surplus and the labor market tightness associated with each worker and industry are given by
Equation (25) implies that total surplus j i is independent of worker j's skill level. Like in section 2, this feature of the equilibrium is an artifact of the particular matching function we are using. More importantly, equation (26) implies that the tightness of the labor market j i is increasing in worker j's skill level. Ceteris paribus, high-skilled workers generate higher surplus when matched with a …rm, which increases the number of …rms searching for them, and in turn, their probabilities of …nding a job. This feature of our model captures in a stylized way the well-known fact that unemployment rates are higher for less-educated workers; see e.g. Mincer [1993] .
Using equations (10), (25) , (26) , and (6), we can express the expected lifetime utility of worker j when unemployed in sector i
and her expected lifetime utility when employed in sector i
4.2 Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others? 12
In order to answer this question, we consider a hypothetical episode of trade liberalization, t 1 = ::: = t n = t < 0. We then compare the expected lifetime utility of a worker j employed in sector i in the 2 steady states: before and after trade liberalization. 13 We denote by c W j i (resp. b U j i ) the expected lifetime utility of worker j when employed (resp. unemployed) in sector i after trade liberalization. In order to avoid a taxonomic exercise, we restrict our attention to equilibria where: (i) workers never quit their jobs after trade liberalization,
U j for all i = 1; :::; n and j 2 [0; 1]; and (ii) workers always work in sectors where they have sector-speci…c human capital before trade liberalization. 14 The change in the expected lifetime utility of a worker j employed in sector i is given by
where The next proposition describes the impact of human capital speci-…city on workers'trade-policy preferences.
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, workers are more likely to be protectionist if the speci…city of their human capital j is high.
Proof. Consider 2 workers, j 1 and j 2 , employed in sector i before trade liberalization such that a j 1 i = a j 2 i and j 1 j 2 . a j 1 i = a j 2 i implies:
i 0 for all i 0 = 0; :::; n, and so b
Combining these results with equation (29), we get:
i . QED. The proof of proposition 3 is almost trivial. By de…nition, workers with more general human capital lose less when switching sectors. This implies better outside options once unemployed, which reduces their incentives to be protectionist. Though simple, this idea may help explain, for example, the negative impact of age on attitudes towards free trade; see e.g. O' Rourke and Sinott [2001] and Mayda and Rodrik [2005] .
Over time, human capital becomes more speci…c. As a result, workers become less mobile across sectors, and so more likely to oppose trade liberalization.
Note that the Ricardo-Viner model, absent of any search frictions, leads to a similar prediction. Namely, the owners of the speci…c factors should be more protectionist than the owners of the mobile factor. However, the insights of our theory are more subtle. In our model, the speci…city of human capital only matters if the decrease in the trade tax is large enough to trigger a reallocation of workers across sectors. This suggests that the impact of speci…city on trade-policy preferences should be stronger in industries where trade liberalization leads to a larger decline in domestic prices.
If we reinterpret the speci…city of workers'human capital in terms of "mobility", this prediction accords well with the results of Scheve and Slaughter [2001] . Using data from the 1992 National Election Studies survey, the authors …nd a positive correlation between home ownership in counties with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparativedisadvantage industries and the support for trade barriers. They interpret this result as evidence of the impact of asset values, in addition to current factor incomes, on trade-policy preferences. An alternative interpretation o¤ered by our theory is that: (i) workers in these counties are more likely to lose their jobs; and that: (ii) once unemployed, home ownership increases the costs of moving to another sector.
Using equations (12) , (26) , and (28), we can rearrange equation (29) into
The …rst term captures the gains from trade liberalization: higher consumer surplus, [ + ! + s(p)]. The second term captures the losses: di¢ culty of …nding new jobs once unemployed, a j i t; and destruction of existing jobs,
. Our next prediction on the determinants of trade-policy preferences can be stated as follows:
Proposition 4 If r is large enough, then workers are less likely to be protectionist if their productivity a j i is high.
Proof. See Appendix. If r is large enough, workers mostly care about their current incomes. Whether they have general or sector-speci…c human capital, the main determinant of their trade-policy preferences is the probability of losing their jobs. As a result, more productive workers-who are less likely to become unemployed 15 -also are less likely to be protectionist. Proposition 4 directly implies:
Corollary 1 If r is large enough, then the prevalence of protectionism among workers decreases with: . Using data from the 1995-1997 World Values Surveys and the 1995 International Social Survey Programme, they …nd that: (i) workers in more developed countries tend to be less protectionist, irrespectively of their skill level; and that: (ii) high-skilled workers tend to be less protectionist than low-skilled workers, irrespectively of their countries of origin (though less so in less developed countries). This can easily be seen in …gure 1 which is constructed from the World Values Survey 1994-1999; see appendix for details. [2001] . The latter focus on the …rst partskilled workers are less protectionists almost everywhere-and the former on the second part-less so in less developed countries-while arguing that the least developed countries, for which unskilled workers tend to be less protectionist, are not in the sample. We have nothing to add to this debate.
To us, the …rst …nding is the most problematic for the Heckscher-Ohlin model: Why would unskilled workers in a less developed countrywho win more, or at least lose less, from free trade according to this theory-ever be more protectionist than their counterparts in a more developed country? We believe that our model provides a simple and intuitive answer to this question.
Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions à la Pissarides [2000] . Regarding the structure of trade protection, our model predicts that in a cross-section of industries or countries, those parameters which are positively correlated with the unemployment rate-workers'bargaining power and turnover rate-should also be positively correlated with trade taxes. The converse is true for those parameters which are negatively correlated with unemployment-world price and workers' productivity. Regarding individual trade-policy preferences, our model predicts that workers with more general human capital are less likely to be protectionist. It also predicts that if workers'discount factors are large, then more productive workers are less likely to be protectionist, irrespectively of the countries and industries where they are located. Though distinct from the predictions of standard trade models, these …ndings accord well with a large body of empirical work. To us, this illustrates a key idea: the extensive margin of trade protection-whether or not workers keep their jobs and their associated rents-may matter as much in practice as the intensive margin-by how much these rents vary. 19 
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The second-order condition @ 2 G
implies that @t o i @z i has the same sign as @ 2 G @z i @t i t o i for z i 2 fa i ; i ; i ; p i g.
We now compute the sign of each of these cross-derivatives. Claim (i): @ 2 G @a i @t i t o i < 0
Proof: As mentioned in the main text, we have
Since the …rst term does not depend on a i , we only need to show that the last two terms are decreasing in a i . By equation (14), we have Proof: Let us start from equation (31) . All we need to show is that:
and 1 i + i are increasing functions of i . By equation (14), we have
which, by inspection, is increasing in i . Similarly, we have Proof: Again, we start from equation (31) . All we need to show is that: i ( i + i ) 2 and i i + i are increasing functions of i . By equation (14), we have
which, by inspection, is increasing in i . Similarly, we have
which is increasing in i as well. QED. Claim (iv):
Proof: Again, we start from equation (31) . Since i is increasing in p i by equation (14), 1 ( i + i ) 2 and 1 i + i are decreasing in p i . Thus, all we need to show is that d 0 i (p i ) is decreasing in p i as well (recall that equation (22) implies t 0 i > 0). We know that d 0 i (p i ) = 1 00 i ( 0 i ) 1 (p i ) , which further implies
where the last inequality comes from 00 i < 0 and 000 i 0. QED. Proof of proposition 4. We …rst introduce some additional notations. We de…ne f (a j i ) as f (a j i ) a j i + 1 i + g 3 = 1
By construction, we have: g 1 > 0, g 2 > 0 and g 3 (a i j ) g 3 . Hence, equation (35) where c W j i b U j > 0 implies rk i(j) 1 i(j) + g 3 (a i j ) > 0. Note that g 1 and g 2 are increasing in r. As a result, we have 8 <
:
Combining the last series of inequalities, we get
1, for all a j i If r r, we obtain in turn
1, for all a j i By de…nition of @f @a j i , this further implies @f @a j i 0 for all a j i . QED. Claims 1 and 2 together imply that if r is large enough, then workers are less likely to be protectionist if their productivity a j i is high.
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